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UID:6ae6b52c-b761-4fc0-97e8-638f9f01c714@nexttoyou
DTSTAMP:20261106T173723Z
DTSTART:20261106T203000Z
DTEND:20261106T213000Z
SUMMARY:Fall Colloquium Series: Hallie Liberto
LOCATION:Dodd Hall Auditorium (DHA) 103\, 646 W Jefferson St.\, Tallahasse
 e\, FL
DESCRIPTION:Please join FSU Philosophy for the next talk in our Fall 2026 
 Colloquium Series:\n\nSpeaker: Hallie Liberto (University of Maryland)\n\
 nTitle: Non-Committal Threats\n\nAbstract:\n\nMany philosophers argue tha
 t threats have no distinctive illocutionary force and often operate obscu
 rely and ambiguously rather than through a mutually recognized speech act
 . When they do carry illocutionary force (the argument goes) they piggy-b
 ack on other speech acts - like assertions\, directives\, or warnings. Ho
 wever\, of those who do think that some threats comprise a special kind o
 f unified speech act\, the most popular view is that they are a type of c
 ommissive\, like a promise\, but with dark content.\n\nI am developing a 
 competing\, unified theory of threats as speech acts. However\, in this p
 aper (or colloquium\, rather)\, I'm going to focus on just one part of th
 at theory. i introduce and examine three kinds of non-commissive threats\
 , which I call: terrorizing threats\, target-making threats\, and unbindi
 ng threats. I argue that the second two of these non-committal threats ca
 n be (and should be) theorized together with committal threats as differe
 nt versions of the same speech act. I go on to explain how unbinding thre
 ats in particular can play a unique role in coercion\, especially institu
 tional coercion\, and upset some standard assumptions about threat-making
  in moral philosophy.\n\nhttp://next-to-u.app/events/6ae6b52c-b761-4fc0-9
 7e8-638f9f01c714
URL:http://next-to-u.app/events/6ae6b52c-b761-4fc0-97e8-638f9f01c714
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